Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a philosophical doctrine particularly associated with the English philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748-1812) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). It holds, as Mill expresses it (Utilitarianism (1863), ch. II), that 'the foundation of morals <is> ... the Greatest Happiness Principle' , i.e., that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends solely on its effect on the general happiness, and that 'actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness <and> wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness'. 'By happiness', he explains. 'is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure'.

It is clear that, whatever the details, utilitarianism maintains that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the goodness or badness of its consequences, and so is what is sometimes called a consequentialist moral theory. Consequentialist moral theories may be contrasted, on the one hand, with moral theories (such as that of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)) which hold that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends on its conformity (or lack of conformity) to an acceptable moral rule or principle and, on the other, with moral theories (such as that of the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BCE)) which hold that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends on its being an action which a person of good character would (or would not) do in the circumstances..

Again, it is clear that, at least according to Bentham and Mill, the consequences of an action are to be judged good if, taking into account all those individuals affected by it, the action produces an overall increase in pleasure and/or a decrease in pain, and bad if the action produces the opposite of this. In holding that pleasure and pain constitute the criterion for the goodness or badness of an action's consequences, Bentham and Mill endorse a form of hedonistic utilitarianism. There are other, non-hedonistic forms of utilitarianism, which agree with Bentham and Mill that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the goodness or badness of its consequences but propose a different, non-hedonistic criterion for judging those consequences to be good or bad.

It would seem natural to object to utilitarianism, as so far presented, that we firmly believe that some actions (e.g., keeping a promise, respecting a person's rights, telling the truth) are morally right even in circumstances in which an alternative course of action would have better consequences, and that some actions (e.g., torture) are morally wrong whatever the consequences. However, utilitarianism, whether in a hedonistic or a non-hedonistic form, may be developed in many different ways, some of which leave it much less vulnerable to this line of objection.

It is necessary, for example, to distinguish between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. While act utilitarianism holds that the Greatest Happiness Principle should be applied directly to individual actions (so that an action is right if it contributes more to the general happiness than any available alternative), rule utilitarianism holds that the Greatest Happiness Principle should be applied to types or kinds of action (so that a type or kind of action is right if its general performance contributes more to the general happiness than its general non-performance). Clearly rule utilitarianism, unlike act utilitarianism, provides a justification for such moral 'rules' and principles as 'Keep your promises' and 'Tell the truth', and so is well placed to accommodate our moral intuition that it is right to keep a promise or tell the truth even though in the circumstances better consequences might result from our not doing so.

It is also necessary to distinguish between utilitarianism as a descriptive or explanatory moral theory and utilitarianism as a prescriptive or revisionary moral theory. As a descriptive theory, utilitarianism is intended as a philosophical account of the moral beliefs we actually hold, while as a prescriptive theory, utilitarianism is intended as an account of the moral beliefs we ought to hold, i.e., the moral beliefs it is rational for us to hold. Clearly prescriptive utilitarianism, unlike descriptive utilitarianism, can dismiss our intuition that it is right to keep a promise even though better consequences might result from our not doing so - provided it can show that the intuition lacks rational justification.

Contemporary moral philosophers are divided about the acceptability of utilitarianism. Some are committed utilitarians, conceding that the most common versions of the theory are unsatisfactory but believing that an adequate version will eventually be found. Others reject utilitarianism as irremediably flawed: it can provide, they insist, only a partial or one-sided account of morality because fundamentally it recognises only those virtues which are forms of benevolence (such as kindness, compassion, sympathy, and generosity) but cannot find a proper place for honesty, integrity, fairness, courage, truthfulness, and all the other virtues which are not forms of benevolence.

See also Bentham and John Stuart Mill.